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His frustration with some Americans was like that of a disappointed 
parent. He was so content in this country, so impressed with and 
loving of its opportunities, but then why, sometimes, did Americans 
fall short of their best selves? 
 —Dave Eggers, Zeitoun1 
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 1. DAVE EGGERS, ZEITOUN 37 (2009). This nonfiction narrative traces the story of Abdulrah-
man Zeitoun. Though not about poverty, it does succinctly capture the frustration many people faced 
with post-Katrina New Orleans. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On many accounts, it is a tale of two cities. 
The headlines and marketing machines tout to the world that “The 
Big Easy is Back.”2 But beyond the celebrations and parades, the story 
for poor Katrina survivors is very different. While many residents and 
businesses are enjoying a resurgence a decade after Katrina stormed 
through, others in post-Katrina New Orleans have a different experience. 
More than ten years after Hurricane Katrina, the city still struggles with 
systemic failures. These problem areas include housing, health care, 
mental health treatment, employment, education, and the criminal justice 
system. All of these challenges are much more apparent in poor, thinly-
resourced communities of color. 
This Article explores the impact capitalism and market-based strat-
egies have had on the resurgence of New Orleans. The government’s 
embrace of privatization within historically public domains has only 
widened the gap between the poor and the affluent communities of New 
Orleans. The Article specifically uses the challenges poor people face in 
the schools and the criminal justice system to critique the importation of 
market-based strategies in the public arena. These practices are especial-
ly pernicious because of the cycle they promote. Impaired access to edu-
cation and exposure to the criminal justice system have long been re-
garded as significant indicators of whether someone will remain in pov-
erty.3 Moreover, a strong correlation exists between students who are 
cast out from the school system due to academic underperformance or 
minor disciplinary infractions and those who become trapped in the crim-
inal justice system. The numerous legal challenges against the post-
Katrina school and criminal court systems indicate that reliance on mar-
ket-based strategies in these arenas is fraught with legal defects. The pro-
liferation of charter schools and the privatization of the criminal justice 
system have allowed both systems to impair individual rights. 
                                                      
 2. See, e.g., Mark Johanson, For New Orleans It’s Been Anything But Easy, But the Big Easy Is 
Back, Post-Katrina Style, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2012), http://www.ibtimes.com/new-orleans-
its-been-anything-easy-big-easy-back-post-katrina-style-758817; Bob Schieffer, The Big Easy Is 
Back & Better Than Ever, CBS NEWS (Feb. 3, 2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/schieffer-the-
big-easy-is-back-better-than-ever/. 
 3. REBECCA VALLAS & SHARON DIETRICH, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, ONE STRIKE AND 
YOU’RE OUT: HOW WE CAN ELIMINATE BARRIERS TO ECONOMIC SECURITY AND MOBILITY FOR 
PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS 26 (2014), available at https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/12/VallasCriminalRecordsReport.pdf.  
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Following the introduction, Part I of this Article traces the unprece-
dented expansion of charter schools in post-Katrina New Orleans. This 
section examines the rise of charter schools in the city following the 
storm, tracks their gains, and identifies some limitations raised by the 
creation of an all-charter model. This section also highlights some of the 
questionable practices employed at charter schools to boost academic 
performance. Critics challenge such practices as concerted efforts to 
marginalize students who threaten the “bottom line.” Next, this section 
examines some of the lawsuits that came about as a result of New Orle-
ans’ charter school model. It specifically analyzes the claims that the 
charter school model dilutes individual rights for the city’s most vulnera-
ble populations—the poor, the learning-disabled, and children of color. 
Part II of this Article discusses the ways in which indigent criminal 
defendants shoulder the financial burden for the New Orleans criminal 
justice system—from health care perks for judges to profits for jailers. In 
Part III, this Article explores possible solutions to level the playing field 
for people with limited resources in the classroom and criminal justice 
system. The Article specifically advocates for reform tied to greater 
community involvement and heightened accountability. Given the ways 
in which the pursuit of profit and the dilution of individual rights are in-
extricably bound, this Article makes a case for exercising caution within 
the capitalistic encroachment of market-based strategies in the public 
schools and criminal justice arenas. As New Orleans serves as an exper-
imental model for the nation on these issues, the government must main-
tain stringent safeguards to guard against the marginalization of vulnera-
ble communities. The influence of the city’s post-Katrina policy experi-
ment is magnified as other urban areas look to its novel methods to con-
front similar challenges. 
I. EXPANSION OF CHARTER SCHOOLS AT THE EXPENSE OF VULNERABLE 
STUDENTS 
New Orleans’ charter school proliferation following Katrina is a na-
tional example of market-based influence in education. New Orleans has 
promoted this new system’s success by pointing to gains the district has 
made on standardized tests. Indeed, by many important measures, the 
charter schools in New Orleans look like a success story: high school 
graduation rates are up,4 more seniors are attending college,5 and some 
                                                      
 4. Walt Garner, Are New Orleans Charter Schools a Model?, EDUC. WK. (Sept. 4, 2015, 7:54 
AM), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/walt_gardners_reality_check/2015/09/the_truth_about_new_ 
orleans_schools.html. 
 5. Id. 
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standardized test scores have improved.6 One study found academic 
gains among New Orleans charter school students,7 suggesting a clear 
improvement for students in New Orleans following the expansion of the 
charter system. For example, a comparison of scores before and after 
Katrina show the following gains: High school graduation jumped from 
54.4% to 77.6%.8 The graduation rate for African-American males in 
New Orleans is 64.9%, higher than the national average.9 The average 
number of students performing at grade level in reading and math 
jumped from 23% in 2007 to 57% in 2013.10 
Some insist, however, that because the public schools in New Orle-
ans were in such dire straits, there was no place to go but up. Public 
schools in New Orleans were in bad shape long before Katrina arrived. 
The graduation rate was nearly 18% lower than the national average.11 
Among seventh and eighth graders, almost 70% were testing below basic 
proficiency in English, and 70% tested below proficiency in math.12 
There was widespread corruption in New Orleans’s public school sys-
                                                      
 6. Id. 
 7. Danielle Dreilinger, New Orleans’ Charter School Academic Growth Superior, Study Says, 
TIMES-PICAYUNE (Mar. 19, 2015, 3:39 PM), http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2015/03/ 
new_orleans_charter_school_suc.html (“Gains were especially large in mathematics, where char-
ter students progressed almost twice as far in a year than their peers in conventional schools. In 
reading, they showed two thirds more progress.”). The data on academic gains in the post-
Katrina charter schools has been widely studied. See, e.g., Robert Garda, Searching for Equity 
Amid a System of Schools: The View from New Orleans, 42 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 613, 615–18 (2015); 
see also TULANE UNIV. COWEN INST. FOR PUB. EDUC. INITIATIVES, NOLA BY THE NUMBERS: 
SCHOOL ENROLLMENT AND DEMOGRAPHICS, OCT. 2013, at 1 (2014), available at 
http://www.coweninstitute.com/our-work/applied-research/nola-by-the-numbers/nbtn-october-
2013/#report. 
 8. Lyndsey Layton, In New Orleans, Major School District Closes Traditional Public Schools 
for Good, WASH. POST (May 28, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/in-new-
orleans-traditional-public-schools-close-for-good/2014/05/28/ae4f5724-e5de-11e3-8f90-73e071 
f3d637_story.html. 
 9. Ten Years After Hurricane Katrina: Where We Are Now, RECOVERY SCH. DIST. (Aug. 2, 
2015), http://www.rsdla.net/apps/news/show_news.jsp?REC_ID=363101&id=0. But that figure does 
not tell the whole story. “While 66 percent of black students in Louisiana graduated from high 
school, only 4 percent—among the lowest in the nation—showed they were ready for all four sub-
jects tested on the ACT in 2015.” Will Sentell, Black Students in Louisiana Continue to Rank Behind 
Peers on Education Tests, New Report Shows, ADVOCATE (Dec. 10, 2015, 10:41 AM), 
http://theadvocate.com/news/14228167-123/black-students-in-louisiana-continue-to-rank-behind-
peers-on-education-tests-new-report-shows. 
 10. Layton, supra note 8. However, it is important to note that critics challenge the validity of 
the statistics because shifts in student population—where thousands of students did not return to 
New Orleans after the storm—prevent a direct comparison. Id. 
 11. Colleen Kimmett, 10 Years After Katrina, New Orleans’ All-Charter School System Has 
Proven a Failure, IN THESE TIMES (Aug. 28, 2015), http://inthesetimes.com/article/18352/10-years-
after-katrina-new-orleans-all-charter-district-has-proven-a-failure. 
 12. Id. 
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tem.13 In 2004, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) indicted almost 
a dozen people for criminal offenses against the district related to finan-
cial mismanagement.14 Superintendents came through the district like a 
revolving door; in seven years, there were eight people in the post.15 Cor-
ruption was so rampant that the FBI and other federal and local investi-
gators set up a satellite branch in the school board’s building itself.16 The 
systemic dysfunction was then compounded by infrastructure challenges 
left in the wake of Katrina. 
Hurricane Katrina was the most devastating natural disaster to hit 
the United States in seventy-five years.17 The storm and consequent levee 
breach took more than 1,800 lives,18 shattered homes, and crushed the 
public’s faith in government. It also served a fatal blow to the city’s pub-
lic schools, which were already on life support. Following Hurricane 
Katrina’s tear through New Orleans on August 29, 2005, the school sys-
tem was virtually “wiped out.”19 Buildings were not habitable.20 More 
than 7,000 New Orleans teachers and staff—many of whom the storm 
left homeless—were on “disaster leave without pay.”21 
The combination of the pervasive dysfunction in New Orleans 
schools pre-Katrina, and the obliteration of infrastructure post-Katrina, 
set the stage for a massive takeover. Enter RSD. Prior to Hurricane 
Katrina, the state of Louisiana had established RSD, or the Recovery 
School District, as a special authority to take over the worst-performing 
schools in Louisiana.22 After the storm, the state moved almost all of 
                                                      
 13. See Douglas N. Harris, Good News for New Orleans, EDUCATIONNEXT (Sept. 16, 2015), 
http://educationnext.org/good-news-new-orleans-evidence-reform-student-achievement. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Hurricane Katrina Statistics Fast Facts, CNN (Aug. 24, 2015, 11:30 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/23/us/hurricane-katrina-statistics-fast-facts/. More than 500,000 people 
were displaced by Katrina. The damages were in excess of $100 billion. Id. More than 70% of occu-
pied housing in New Orleans was damaged by the storm. Id. The storm made landfall on the Gulf 
Coast as a Category Three storm. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Thomas Toch, The Big Easy’s Grand Experiment, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Aug. 18, 
2015, 9:00 AM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/knowledge-bank/2015/08/18/lessons-from-new-
orleans-post-katrina-charter-school-experiment. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Danielle Dreilinger, Recovery School District Will Be Country’s First All-Charter District 
in September 2014, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Dec. 19, 2013, 5:51 PM), http://www.nola.com/education/ 
index.ssf/2013/12/recovery_school_district_will_3.html. “The Recovery School District was creat-
ed in Louisiana in 2003 to transform persistently failing schools. It started small in New Orle-
ans, taking and chartering only five of the many eligible schools.” Id.; see also Scott R. Bauries, 
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New Orleans’ public schools under the RSD’s umbrella.23 The legislature 
acted aggressively to pass Act 3524 to transfer more than 100 public 
schools to the RSD.25 The RSD either closed the failing schools or con-
verted them to charter models; in addition, it directly ran some schools in 
New Orleans that were not chartered.26 School officials said there was 
never any intention to rebuild the traditional public school model.27 Cur-
rently, New Orleans’ schools are nearly all charter schools.28 At the start 
of the 2014–2015 school year, the RSD administered fifty-seven charter 
schools operating in New Orleans under twenty-four different nonprofit 
charter management organizations.29 The Orleans Parish School Board 
(OPSB) also oversees charters.30 There are also a handful of independent 
charter schools overseen by the Board of Elementary and Secondary Ed-
ucation.31 The school system in New Orleans has a multitude of different 
school operators.32 
In 2005–2006, the OPSB had an operating budget of nearly $400 
million.33 “Most of these monies [were] allocated to the state-run Recov-
ery School District and privately operated charter schools, with only a 
handful of traditional public schools remaining under the locally elected 
board.”34 Following Katrina, charter schools received the bulk of federal 
                                                                                                                         
State Constitutional Design and Education Reform: Process Specification in Louisiana, 40 J.L. & 
EDUC. 1, 57, 59–62 (2011). 
 23. Harris, supra note 13. 
 24. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:10.7 (2005) (amended 2008). 
 25. Ten Years After Hurricane Katrina: Where We Are Now, supra note 9. 
 26. Layton, supra note 8. 
 27. See id. 
 28. See id; see also Kristen Buras, Charter Schools Flood New Orleans, PROGRESSIVE (Dec. 
26, 2014), http://www.progressive.org/news/2014/12/187949/charter-schools-flood-new-orleans 
(calling New Orleans the nation’s first all-charter school district). 
 29. Ten Years After Hurricane Katrina: Where We Are Now, supra note 9. By September 2015, 
the RSD oversaw fifty-two charter schools in New Orleans and the Orleans Parish School Board 
oversaw eighteen charter schools, as well as six direct-run schools. PATRICK SIMS, TULANE UNIV. 
COWEN INST. FOR PUB. EDUC. INITIATIVES, NEW ORLEANS PUBLIC SCHOOL GOVERNANCE 1 (2015), 
available at http://www.coweninstitute.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Governance.Brief_ 
.2015.pdf. The Board of Elementary and Secondary Education also directly authorized five charter 
schools that operated out of New Orleans. Id. 
 30. Jennifer C. Berkshire, “Reform” Makes Broken New Orleans Schools Worse: Race, Char-
ters, Testing and the Real Story of Education After Katrina, SALON (Aug. 3, 2015, 2:57 AM), 
http://www.salon.com/2015/08/03/reform_makes_broken_new_orleans_schools_worse_race_charter
s_testing_and_the_real_story_of_education_after_katrina. 
 31. Id. 
 32. TULANE UNIV. COWEN INST. FOR PUB. EDUC. INITIATIVES, THE STATE OF PUBLIC 
EDUCATION IN NEW ORLEANS: 2012 REPORT 1, 2 (2013), available at http://www.cowen 
institute.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/SPENO-20121.pdf [hereinafter THE STATE OF PUBLIC 
EDUCATION IN NEW ORLEANS: 2012 REPORT]. 
 33. Buras, supra note 28. 
 34. Id. 
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and private funding, including more than $20 million in general funding 
and another $25 million from the U.S Department of Education to estab-
lish new charter schools.35 
Indeed, there is a lot of money connected to charter schools. The 
charter schools system in America—just two decades old36—brings both 
opportunities and challenges for students and educators. Charter schools 
and public schools are both funded by the public.37 But they differ in 
many significant ways. Though the charter school is publicly funded, it is 
usually governed by a group under a legislative contract—or charter—
with the authorizer (typically a state entity).38 The charter exempts the 
schools from some traditional public school rules and regulations.39 The 
school’s charter sets out all details of the school’s operation; everything 
from the curriculum, name, organization, and management, and methods 
of assessing student performance are set out in the charter.40 Transporta-
tion decisions, building maintenance, and services offered to special 
needs students also fall under the control of the charter organizations, 
depending on the type of charter the operator has.41 
Charter schools can operate with greater autonomy and flexibility 
because they are freed from district mandates and labor unions that 
sometimes impair the efficiency of staffing.42 They have been hailed by 
many education experts as innovation labs that allow for greater experi-
                                                      
 35. Nghana Lewis, After Katrina: Poverty, Politics, and Performance in New Orleans Public 
Schools, 11 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 285, 287 (2010). 
 36. See Layton, supra note 8; Claudio Sanchez, From a Single Charter School, a Movement 
Grows, NPR (Aug. 31, 2012, 6:19 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/09/02/160409742/from-a-single-
charter-school-a-movement-grows. 
 37. See Fast Facts: Charter Schools, NAT’L CENTER FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, 
https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=30 (last visited May 22, 2016). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Charter Schools: Finding Out the Facts: At a Glance, CENTER FOR PUB. EDUC., 
http://www.centerforpubliceducation.org/Main-Menu/Organizing-a-school/Charter-schools-Finding-
out-the-facts-At-a-glance (last visited May 22, 2016). 
 41. Layton, supra note 8. There are seven types of charter schools that could be authorized in 
New Orleans and Louisiana. See Sims, supra note 29, at 2. 
 42. School leaders say the flexibility in personnel management is key to their design. Without 
union contracts tying their hands, leaders hired anyone they wanted, which often included teachers 
from alternative programs such as Teach for America or The New Teacher Project. Charter school 
proponents say such flexible staffing models are key contributors to school success. Harris, supra 
note 13. Charter school critics say such staffing models are disruptive because these teachers do not 
stay in their posts long, and that negatively impacts student learning. Rachel Monahan, Charter 
Schools Try to Retain Students with Mom-Friendly Policies, ATLANTIC (Nov. 11, 2014), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2014/11/charter-schools-now-try-to-keep-teachers-
with-mom-friendly-policies/382602/. 
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mentation.43 To the extent that charter schools minimize state oversight 
in favor of “success” markers, such as improved test scores and more 
choice for parents, they are representative of market-based principles—
for better or for worse. “A defining characteristic of charter schools is 
that they introduce a strong market element into public education. Over 
time, the firms that are well run and that satisfy consumer preferences 
will tend to expand or be replicated while those that are less successful 
will go out of business.”44 Generally, traditional public schools are 
replaced with independently managed schools that set their own 
standards for admission, discipline, expulsion, and fiscal accountability.45 
Rather than reporting to community and parent-stacked organizations, 
principals at charter schools function more like CEOs who report to 
nonprofit boards.46 
MIT professor and activist Noam Chomsky stresses that public 
education is a central component of democracy.47 He has warned about 
the push to “corporatize” public schools and the dangers of 
overemphasizing high-stakes tests.48 The expansive charter school sys-
tem implemented in New Orleans provides an important case study49 to 
examine the efficacy of charter schools, the opportunities they offer, and 
a chance to carefully consider the risks and possible legal hurdles created 
by the characterization of schools. 
While proponents of charter school expansion cite to students’ un-
precedented standardized test score improvements, not all reports of the 
                                                      
 43. See Roland G. Fryer, Jr., Learning from the Success and Failures of Charter Schools 1, 5–9 
(The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper No. 2012-06), available at http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/ 
fryer/files/hamilton_project_paper_2012.pdf (addressing the innovation hallmark that is intended to 
define charter schools). 
 44. Charter Schools Offer Free Market Solutions to Public Education, NAT’L CENTER FOR 
POL’Y ANALYSIS (May 7, 2015), http://www.ncpa.org/sub/dpd/index.php?Article_ID=25635. 
 45. CENTER FOR PUB. EDUC., supra note 40. New Orleans has standardized both admission and 
expulsion practices. See Toch, supra note 19. Of course charter schools are still barred from discrim-
inating on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, disability, sex, and other characteristics 
protected by law. 
 46. Berkshire, supra note 30. 
 47. See Brian Canova, MIT Professor Noam Chomsky Discusses Education, Chicago Teacher 
Strike Ahead of Public Speaking Events at MIT, MASSLIVE (Sept. 25, 2012, 2:10 PM), 
http://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/2012/09/mit_professor_noam_chomsky_dis.html. 
 48. Id. 
 49. What is happening in New Orleans will have a huge impact on other school districts. “Na-
tionally, New Orleans became an example to be praised or hated. People came from all over to 
see or work in the New Orleans ‘experiment’ or to publicize its problems. Michigan and Ten-
nessee launched similar, smaller recovery districts; Georgia’s is underway. And the Recovery 
system took over several failing schools in Baton Rouge and Shreveport.” Danielle Dreilinger, 10 
Years After New Orleans School Takeover, Here’s Where It Stands, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Nov. 20, 
2015, 2:47 PM), http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2015/11/rsd_takeover_turns_10.html. 
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new charter schools in New Orleans have been positive. Critics of charter 
schools challenge the practices that led to such academic gains, arguing 
they leave some students behind. They say such practices “amplify con-
cerns about racial equality and loss of parental control.”50 Critics also 
complain that the public charter school system dilutes democratic ac-
countability because charter organizations do not need to answer to vot-
ers.51 There are also concerns that the charter school system has stripped 
poor communities of a strong community base52 and has created a zero-
tolerance culture that promotes worker–learners.53 Others who have 
watched communities trade public schools for charter schools “report the 
same problems that New Orleans residents describe: closures of public 
schools that held neighborhoods together, younger and less experienced 
teachers, the loss of union jobs, experimental teaching practic[e]s that 
can be rigid or harsh, cherrypicking of students[54] and rapid teacher 
burn-out.”55 
There have been allegations that some charter schools have deliber-
ately under-enrolled and shut out students in an effort to protect test 
scores and maintain strong “success” markers.56 This market-based ap-
                                                      
 50. Layton, supra note 8; see also Brooke Finley, Comment, Growing Charter School Segre-
gation and the Need for Integration in Light of Obama’s Race to the Top Program, 52 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 933, 943–48 (2015); Garda, supra note 7, at 618 nn.17–19; Osamudia R. James, Opt-Out Edu-
cation: School Choice as Racial Subordination, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1083, 1116 (2014) (addressing 
charter schools as a school choice scheme that perpetuates racial subordination); Sarah Carr, School 
Choice Series: Grandmother Struggles to Navigate System, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Nov. 10, 2009), 
http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2009/11/post_44.html; Sarah Carr, School Choice Series: 
Mother Is Determined to Find Best Public Pre-K, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Nov. 10, 2009), 
http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2009/11/school_choice.html. 
 51. Layton, supra note 8. In 2010, a public hearing was held on whether public schools would 
return to traditional management or remain under charter control. Buras, supra note 28. Hundreds of 
African Americans from the community attended the rally. Id. Those in attendance said “[t]he feel-
ing of disenfranchisement was palpable that evening.” Id. 
 52. See Dreilinger, supra note 22 (“Alumni and some community members have decried the 
loss of many of the city’s historic high schools, which the Recovery School District has closed, 
merged or never reopened after the storm, including L.E. Rabouin, John F. Kennedy and Booker 
T. Washington.”). 
 53. Kimmett, supra note 11. 
 54. Harris, supra note 13 (noting some principals at charter schools reported “cherry-picking 
students”—that is, counseling out students deemed poor fits and trying to attract better students with 
invitation-only events); see also Garda, supra note 7, at 625–54 and accompanying notes (describing 
challenges to guarantee equity in the New Orleans schools both behind and in front of the podium). 
The alleged “cherry-picking” practice has since been addressed through a OneApp, centralized en-
rollment system for assignment in New Orleans. The State of Public Education in New Orleans: 
2014, TULANE UNIV. COWEN INST. FOR PUB. EDUC. INITIATIVES, 
http://www.speno2014.com/operations-administration/ (last visited May 22, 2016). 
 55. Kimmett, supra note 11. 
 56. Id. (noting one 2015 report found that about a third of school leaders used “creaming” to 
screen out undesirable students). 
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plication in the public schools system has distorted equal access to public 
education.57 Several schools in poor, black communities have closed.58 
Critics have also noted that “in a city that is 65 percent black, the educa-
tion reform movement, including the fastest-growing charter school net-
works, is almost entirely white led.”59 The OPSB was highly criticized 
when it fired 7,000 teachers and paraprofessionals after Katrina, “the 
majority of whom were black New Orleanians and the backbone of the 
city’s middle class.”60 
The unprecedented charter expansion also contributed to the dan-
gerous narrative that public schools are inherently defective. Such mes-
saging is a key element in a cycle that moves funding from public 
schools to privatized, alternative models. Professor Chomsky warns 
against the dangers of such propaganda against troubled public schools: 
“The[] propose[d] alternatives, which sound at the beginning like good 
ideas: charter schools, magnet schools, vouchers, who could be against 
that? You gradually chip away, making the public system less and less 
                                                      
 57. See, e.g., Kristen L. Buras, Race, Charter Schools, and Conscious Capitalism: On the 
Spatial Politics of Whiteness as Property (and the Unconscionable Assault on Black New Orleans), 
81 HARV. EDUC. REV. 296 (2011); see also Garda, supra note 7, at 613 (analyzing the cautionary 
lessons learned from the impact of market strategies in the New Orleans schools). Several other 
scholars have also traced the relationship between free market principles, social inequality, and 
education access. See, e.g., Areto Imoukhuede, The Fifth Freedom: The Constitutional Duty to Pro-
vide Constitutional Education, 22 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 45, 90 (2011) (arguing that public 
education should be deemed a fundamental right under a new analysis that applies to positive rights). 
 58. See Danielle Dreilinger, Civil Rights Complaint Alleges Unequal Treatment for New Orle-
ans Black Public School Students, TIMES-PICAYUNE, (May 13, 2014, 3:36 PM), 
http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2014/05/civil_rights_complaint_alleges.html; see also 
Kimmett, supra note 11. A federal civil rights complaint filed in May 2014 alleged that many of the 
schools closed by RSD were in “poor and working class African American neighborhoods.” Letter 
from Frank J. Buckley, Co-Founder, Conscious Concerned Citizens Controlling Cmty. Changes, and 
Karran Harper Royal, Educ. Advocate, Coalition for Cmty. Schools, to Eric Holder, Att’y General of 
the United States, Arne Duncan, Sec’y of Educ., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., and Taylor August, Reg’l Dir., 
Office for Civil Rights—Dallas, Civil Rights Complaint Filed against the Louisiana Department of 
Education, Recovery School District, and Louisiana State Board of Elementary and Secondary Edu-
cation (May 13, 2014), available at http://b.3cdn.net/advancement/24a04d1624216c28b1_ 
4pm6y9lvo.pdf. 
 59. Berkshire, supra note 30; Diane Ravitch, founder of the Network for Public Education, 
challenged the wisdom of the New Orleans all-charter model: 
That model requires firing all the teachers, no matter their performance, allowing them to 
reapply for a job, and replacing many of them with inexperienced TFA [Teach For Amer-
ica] recruits. That model requires wiping out public schools and replacing them with pri-
vately managed schools that set their own standards for admission, discipline, expulsion, 
and are financially opaque. These heavy-handed tactics require a suspension of democra-
cy that would not be tolerated in a white suburb, but can be done to powerless urban dis-
tricts where the children are black and Hispanic. 
Kimmet, supra note 11. 
 60. Berkshire, supra note 30. 
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functional . . . .”61 Though standardized test scores have improved, dis-
placement of resources in support of privatized schools over traditional 
public schools has come at other “costs.” Moreover, the loss of commu-
nity is an inherent, unavoidable consequence of all charter school sys-
tems. Many of these setbacks disproportionally impact the most vulnera-
ble student populations. 
A. Questionable Practices 
Charter schools’ hyperfocus on standardized test scores fails to 
account for other important “gains” a student experiences through a 
robust education—cultural growth, autonomy, and community. One 
critic of charter schools said the “gains” come at a huge price: 
But what about New Orleanians who have a more expansive defini-
tion of what schools should do—whose descriptions of successful 
schools include, not just academic achievement, but harder-to-
measure concepts like community building, justice, liberation, and 
the ability of the city’s children to not just survive but thrive in their 
own world?62 
Vibrancy in any culture requires “community groups, libraries, public 
schools, neighborhood organizations,”63 and other community-supported 
anchors to promote meaningful interaction between citizens. 
In addition to the hard-to-measure disruptions in the community, 
there are specific and verified practices that make the charter school 
model less than ideal. These problems include posting test scores to 
shame students, “creaming” to filter the best students, extraordinarily 
long periods of time spent travelling on the bus because there are no 
neighborhood schools,64 zero-tolerance discipline measures, cookie-
cutter curricula,65 and unprecedented teacher turnover.66 Charter schools 
                                                      
 61. DAVID BARSAMIAN & NOAM CHOMSKY, PROPAGANDA AND THE PUBLIC MIND: 
CONVERSATIONS WITH NOAM CHOMSKY 102 (2001). 
 62. Berkshire, supra note 30. 
 63. Robert W. McChesney, Introduction to NOAM CHOMSKY, PROFIT OVER PEOPLE 7, 11 
(1999). 
 64. Berkshire, supra note 30. Some students have reported 10–12 hour days when factoring in 
cross-town travel necessitated by a free choice market. Id. 
 65. See Eric Westervelt, A New Orleans Charter School Marches to Its Own Tune, NPR (Oct. 
13, 2014, 3:22 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2014/10/13/354090391/a-new-orleans-charter-
school-marches-to-its-own-tune. Despite some notable standouts, charter schools are often criticized 
for canned curriculum devoid of creativity. Critics say “too many charter schools here share a core 
focus on tough discipline and data-driven instruction that has produced a kind of pedagogic mono-
culture.” Id. 
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must show measurable gains in student test scores or risk closures.67 
Such practices have led to numerous complaints that highlight the legal 
challenges charter schools present. 
B. Challenges from the Classroom to the Courtroom 
The extensive charter school system in post-Katrina New Orleans 
has triggered numerous legal actions from students68 disrupted by the 
change. New Orleans touts itself as a free market of educational options, 
but critics have alleged, in numerous lawsuits, that “choice” in theory 
does not always translate into meaningful “choice” in practice.69 While 
many of the charter schools reported gains, “some pursued test scores 
without concern for community traditions, diversity in hiring, or taking 
care of the neediest students.”70 
Several complaints have been filed on behalf of students who claim 
they are disenfranchised by the charter school system. Recently, for 
example, the Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund and the 
Vietnamese Young American Young Leaders Association filed a 
complaint with the United States Department of Education on behalf of 
Vietnamese and Spanish-speaking families with limited English 
proficiency (LEP).71 The parties alleged that New Orleans schools 
violated their obligations under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
                                                                                                                         
 66. See Monahan, supra note 42 (noting that critics “argue that high departure rates negatively 
affect student learning, create instability in the classroom, and are costly to taxpayers because dis-
tricts and schools must recruit new teachers”); Westervelt, supra note 65. 
 67. Berkshire, supra note 30. 
 68. Disenfranchised students are not the only people seeking redress in the court. Veteran 
teachers also lodged a wrongful termination suit against the state and Orleans Parish School Board. 
See Oliver v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., No. 2005-12244, 2012 WL 2648083 (La. Civ. Dist. Ct. June 
20, 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 133 So. 3d 38 (La. Ct. App. 2014), cert. granted, 141 So. 3d 
274 (La. 2014). These decisions were overturned by the Louisiana Supreme Court. Oliver v. Orleans 
Parish Sch. Bd., 156 So. 3d 596, 623 (La. 2014). See also Kari Dequine Harden, 7,500 Fired 
Teachers Take Their Case to the U.S. Supreme Court, LA. WKLY. (Mar. 16, 2015), 
http://www.louisiana 
weekly.com/7500-fired-teachers-take-their-case-to-u-s-supreme-court/. The teachers enjoyed both 
victories and losses before the United States Supreme Court refused to hear their appeal. Bill 
Quigley, New Orleans Pain Index at 10: Who Was Left Behind, HUFFINGTON POST (July 20, 2015, 
8:45 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bill-quigley/new-orleans-katrina-pain_b_7831870.html. 
 69. Berkshire, supra note 30. 
 70. Dreilinger, supra note 49. 
 71. Letter from Thomas L. Mariadson, Staff Att’y, Asian Am. Legal Def. & Educ. Fund,  and 
Minh Nguyen, Vietnamese Am. Young Leaders Ass’n, Regarding Discrimination Against National 
Origin Minority Students and Parents Who Are Limited English Proficient (LEP) in Orleans Parish 
School Board (OPSB) and Recovery School District (RSD) Schools (Aug. 2, 2013), available at 
http://aaldef.org/VAYLA%20AALDEF%20DOJ%20OCR%20Complaint.pdf. 
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1964.72 Specifically, the complainants alleged that a charter school took a 
“deliberately hostile tone with LEP parents.”73 The complaint also 
alleged that the schools do not provide appropriate interpretation 
services, do not make data about the number of bilingual staff and 
interpreters that are employed at the schools available, and negatively 
impact LEP parents’ ability to monitor their children’s academic 
performance, constituting discrimination on the basis of national origin.74 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act bars discrimination by schools that 
receive federal money.75 Failure to provide equal access to students 
and families with limited English skills constitutes discrimination on 
the basis of national origin.76 Students further alleged that some 
schools placed them in English-as-a-second-language (ESL) classes 
they did not actually need because of their last names.77 
In addition, the Southern Poverty Law Center filed a lawsuit in 
2010 against the Louisiana Department of Education, alleging that it 
failed to provide disabled students the same variety of educational 
programs and services as are available to nondisabled students.78 In part 
a “disability discrimination” claim,79 the suit ultimately settled in 2015.80 
The class action suit was brought on behalf of disabled children who 
sought relief under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improve-
ment Act of 2004 (IDEA), § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and Title II of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).81 
                                                      
 72. Id. at 1. 
 73. Id. at 6. 
 74. Id. at 2, 5, 18. 
 75. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2) (2015). 
 76. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974). 
 77. Danielle Dreilinger, New Orleans Public Schools Inadequate for Non-English Speakers, 
Critics Say, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Aug. 1, 2013, 5:47 PM), http://www.nola.com/education/ 
index.ssf/2013/08/groups_to_file_complaint_alleg.html. 
 78. Complaint at 17, P.B. v. Pastorek (E.D. La. Oct. 26, 2010) (No. 2:10-cv-04049); see also 
Danielle Dreilinger, Landmark New Orleans Special Education Case is Settled, Parties Say, TIMES-
PICAYUNE (Dec. 19, 2014, 2:18 PM), http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2014/12/ 
parties_ask_federal_judge_to_a.html; Louis Foglia, How Katrina Changed Special Education in 
New Orleans, CNN MONEY (Aug. 28, 2015, 8:39 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/08/14/news/ 
hurricane-katrina-special-education/. 
 79. Foglia, supra note 78. 
 80. Press Release, S. Poverty Law Ctr., SPLC Negotiates Landmark Settlement to Help New 
Orleans Students with Disabilities (Dec. 18, 2014), available at https://www.splcenter.org/news/ 
2014/12/19/splc-negotiates-landmark-settlement-help-new-orleans-students-disabilities. One portion 
of the suit was a disability discrimination claim; the bulk of the suit contained allegations that the 
Louisiana Department of Education violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improve-
ment Act of 2004 (IDEA). 
 81. Complaint at 1–2, P.B. v. Pastorek (E.D. La. Oct. 26, 2010) (No. 2:109-cv-04049). 
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The lawsuit came after years of complaints about services delivered 
to special needs students in the charter system, which included 
allegations of emotional abuse, physical abuse, and “counseling out.”82 
Ten students, representing a class of about 4,500 New Orleans students 
with disabilities, filed the lawsuit asserting that the defendants failed to 
properly coordinate, monitor, and oversee special education services of 
the various school districts operating in New Orleans.83 RSD has since 
promised to increase services to special needs students.84 Terms of the 
settlement include increased training and technical assistance for all New 
Orleans schools.85 The settlement also includes a provision that ensures 
that charter schools’ applications and renewals require schools to provide 
a description of the school’s plans for delivering services to students with 
disabilities, among other things.86 
Furthermore, a federal civil rights complaint was filed in 2014 
alleging discrimination against African-American students.87 A national 
coalition of activists88 filed the complaint, citing school closures in New 
Orleans as discriminatory against black students.89 The complaint, filed 
pursuant to Titles IV and VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleges that 
black students were subjected to school closures at a much higher rate 
than white students, and that the state policy failed to provide adequate 
educational alternatives to black students once their schools were 
closed.90 
                                                      
 82. New Orleans Recovery School District Not Quite as Recovered as Advertised, NAT’L 
EDUC. POL’Y CTR. (July 13, 2015), http://nepc.colorado.edu/newsletter/2015/07/new-orleans-
recovery. 
 83. Complaint at 9–11, P.B. v. Pastorek (E.D. La. Oct. 26, 2010) (No. 2:109-cv-04049). 
 84. Press Release, supra note 80. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement at 3, P.B. v. White (No. 2:10-cv-04049), 
available at https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/d6_legacy_files/downloads/resource/ 
pb_v_white_-_notice_of_proposed_class_action_settlement.pdf. 
 87. Kimmett, supra note 11. 
 88. The complaint was filed by local activists Conscious Concerned Citizens Controlling 
Community Changes and Coalition for Community Schools-New Orleans, and backed by several 
groups, including the Kenwood Oakland Community Organization in Chicago, Coalition for Com-
munity Schools, Vietnamese American Young Leaders of New Orleans, New Jersey’s Parents Uni-
fied for Local School Education in Newark, and Journey for Justice member organizations across the 
country. Letter from Frank J. Buckley, Co-Founder, Conscious Concerned Citizens Controlling 
Cmty. Changes, and Karran Harper Royal, Educ. Advocate, Coalition for Cmty. Schools, to Eric 
Holder, Att’y Gen. of the United States, Arne Duncan, Sec’y of Educ., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., and 
Taylor August, Reg’l Dir., Office for Civil Rights—Dallas, Civil Rights Complaint Filed against the 
Louisiana Department of Education, Recovery School District, and Louisiana State Board of Ele-
mentary and Secondary Education (May 13, 2014), available at http://b.3cdn.net/advancement/ 
24a04d1624216c28b1_4pm6y9lvo.pdf. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
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The complaint alleges that RSD’s “blanket acceptance” of charter 
schools and OPSB’s school policies disparately impact black students 
and keep them “trapped in failing schools.”91 According to the 
complaint, white students make up only 10% of the student population in 
New Orleans, but comprise 40% of the population in high-performing 
schools.92 By contrast, the complaint alleges that black students are 80% 
of the total school population, but only comprise 30% to 47% of the 
student population at these high-performing schools.93 The disparity in 
school assignments reduces black students’ access to AP classes, gifted 
classes, and arts and language programming.94 
The snapshot of lawsuits and civil rights complaints here is not 
exhaustive. Other complaints are rooted in funding decisions95 and zero-
tolerance disciplinary measures.96 As other cities consider adopting 
charter schools, the legal challenges to such changes should compel other 
elected officials to act cautiously. At the very least, it should inform their 
judgment about how to improve transparency, accountability, and equal 
opportunity in public education. 
II. THE POOR BEAR THE COSTS OF THE NEW ORLEANS CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 
In New Orleans and elsewhere, students who drop out or who are 
expelled from school face a high risk of future exposure to the criminal 
justice system.97 Nearly 2.2 million Americans, a disproportionate share 
of whom are minorities, are currently in jail or prison.98 Though the 
United States contains less than 5% of the world’s population, it claims 
                                                      
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 16. 
 93. Id. at 23. 
 94. Id. The Louisiana Education Superintendent dismissed the complaint as a “joke.” Danielle 
Dreilinger, John White: New Orleans Charter Civil Rights Complaint ‘a Joke’, TIMES-PICAYUNE 
(May 15, 2014, 9:51 PM), http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2014/05/john_white_new_ 
orleans_charter.html. 
 95. Associated Press, Louisiana Judge Rejects Teachers Union in Charter School Lawsuit, 
TIMES-PICAYUNE (May 15, 2015, 10:10 AM), http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2015/05/ 
louisiana_charter_school_suit.html. 
 96. See Buras, supra note 28 (addressing the civil rights complaint against charter operator 
Collegiate Academies for a “harsh and punitive discipline culture”). 
 97. Carla Amurao, Fact Sheet: How Bad Is the School-to-Prison Pipeline?, TAVIS SMILEY 
REPORTS PBS http://www.pbs.org/wnet/tavissmiley/tsr/education-under-arrest/school-to-prison-
pipeline-fact-sheet/ (last visited May 22, 2016). 
 98. Bill Keller, Prison Revolt: A Former Law-and-Order Conservative Takes a Lead on Crimi-
nal-Justice Reform, NEW YORKER, June 29, 2015, at 22–23 (“African-Americans are nearly six 
times as likely as whites to be incarcerated, and Latinos are more than twice as likely.”). 
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25% of the world’s incarcerated population.99 For its part, Louisiana 
leads all other states in incarceration rates.100 It has been called “the 
world’s prison capital.”101 One in every seven black men is in prison, on 
probation, or on parole.102 New Orleans, the state’s most populous city, 
houses more inmates than any other metropolitan area in the country.103 
Though double the national average, Louisiana’s incarceration rates 
are consistent with a three-decade-long upward trend across the coun-
try.104 The number of state and federal criminal defendants sentenced to 
terms of imprisonment more than quintupled from 1980 to 2010.105 
Though imprisonment rates grew steadily throughout the 1980s, the Vio-
lent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 ushered in the era 
of mass incarceration.106 By any measure, the legislation remains the 
most expansive crime bill in U.S. history.107 The law poured billions of 
discretionary dollars into local law enforcement,108 increased funding for 
prison construction,109 and enhanced penalties for various drug-related 
offenses.110 
                                                      
 99. Id. at 23. 
 100. Campbell Robertson, Suit Alleges ‘Scheme’ in Criminal Costs Borne by New Orleans’s 
Poor, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/18/us/suit-alleges-scheme-in-
criminal-costs-borne-by-new-orleanss-poor.html?_r=0. 
 101. Cindy Chang, Louisiana Is the World’s Prison Capital, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Apr. 6, 2016, 
12:39 PM), http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2012/05/louisiana_is_the_worlds_prison.html 
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 102. Chang, supra note 101. 
 103. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, IN FOR A PENNY: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S NEW DEBTORS’ 
PRISONS 17 (2010), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/InForAPenny_web.pdf. 
 104. Chang, supra note 101 (reporting that from 1992–2012, Louisiana’s prison population 
doubled and “[o]ne in 86 adult Louisianans is doing time, nearly double the national average”). 
 105. E. ANN CARSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 
2013, at fig.1 (2014), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p13.pdf (reflecting a total 
state and federal prison population of approximately 325,000 in 1979 to a “peak [population] of 
1,615,500” in 2009). 
 106. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103–322, 108 Stat. 
1796 (1994), reprinted in 1 BERNARD D. REAMS, JR., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE VIOLENT 
CRIME CONTROL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1994, at v (1997). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. In the early 2000s, the Bush administration capitalized on continued public support of 
aggressive crime control. ALICE GOFFMAN, ON THE RUN: FUGITIVE LIFE IN AN AMERICAN CITY 1 
(2014). In 2003, Attorney General John Ashcroft issued a directive to federal prosecutors to “charge 
and pursue the offense or offenses that generate the most substantial sentence” and to “vigorously 
oppose” any proposed sentencing reductions. Memorandum from Att’y Gen. John Ashcroft to All 
Federal Prosecutors (Sept. 22, 2003), available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2003/ 
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In Louisiana, the 1990s prison-building boom gave rise to a $182 
million dollar industry dependent on inmate-packed cellblocks.111 In ad-
dition to the emergence of homegrown, private prison companies, the 
mass incarceration movement turned rural sheriffs into “prison entrepre-
neurs.”112 Specifically, to stretch budgets, the state encouraged sheriffs to 
take on the expense of new construction costs for jails in return for even-
tual profits.113 The agreement created obvious financial incentives to 
maximize inmate occupancy and minimize expenses.114 Today, the state 
pays a per-diem to jails for each inmate, prompting sheriffs to comb the 
state for “prime sources” of new prisoners.115 Often, inmates are moved 
to rural jails from urban areas, like New Orleans, that have populations to 
spare.116 The state profits as well, incurring significant savings by hous-
ing inmates in local jails rather than prisons.117 In 2013, Louisiana sher-
iffs housed 52% of inmates serving state time in local jails—by far the 
nation’s highest percentage.118 
While crime rates nationwide have decreased over the last thirty 
years, a direct correlation between mass incarceration and the drop in 
crime is dubious.119 Various “social, economic, and environmental fac-
tors,” such as an aging population, decreased unemployment, and modest 
                                                                                                                         
September/03_ag_516.htm. Under Ashcroft’s direction, the Department of Justice steadily increased 
federal prosecutions of street-level drug and firearm possession crimes. See GOFFMAN, supra. 
 111. Chang, supra note 101. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. (“With maximum occupancy and a thrifty touch with expenses, a sheriff can divert the 
profits to his law enforcement arm, outfitting his deputies with new squad cars, guns and laptops.”); 
see also Jan Moller, Prison Sentence Reform Efforts Face Tough Opposition in the Legislature, 
TIMES-PICAYUNE (May 16, 2012, 6:43 AM), http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2012/05/ 
prison_sentence_reform_efforts.html (“The[ ] financial stake [of sheriffs] in the prison system means 
they will lose money if sentences are shortened.”). 
 115. Cindy Chang, In World of Prisons, Some Rural Parishes’ Economies Hinge on Keeping 
Their Jails Full, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (May 13, 2012, 9:53 AM), http://www.nola.com/crime/ 
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 116. Id. 
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sheriff’s per diem.”). 
 118. Julia O’Donoghue, Louisiana Sees Prison Population Fall, but Maintains the Highest 
Incarceration Rate in the United States, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Sept. 17, 2014, 7:55 AM), 
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/09/louisianas_prison_population_f.html. 
 119. DR. OLIVER ROEDER, LAUREN-BROOKE EISEN & JULIA BOWLING, BRENNAN CTR. FOR 
JUSTICE, WHAT CAUSED THE CRIME DECLINE? 3 (2012), available at 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/What_Caused_The_Crime_Decline.p
df (noting that although crime rates have fallen since 1991, the United States “has incarcerated a 
higher percentage of its people, and for a longer period, than any other democracy”). 
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income growth, have contributed to overall crime reduction.120 Put simp-
ly, the salutary effect of skyrocketing imprisonment rates on lower crime 
is negligible.121 Louisiana offers a striking case study. Despite incarcerat-
ing more people than any other state—and for longer periods of time—
Louisiana still has one of the nation’s highest rates of both violent crimes 
and property crimes.122 On the other hand, the economic cost and human 
toll of the “vast, costly social experiment” is incalculable.123 The policies 
associated with the War on Drugs fractured families, disenfranchised 
millions of offenders, and created entrenched social inequality.124 The 
fallout is most acute in impoverished urban neighborhoods like Center 
City in New Orleans, where five in six children grow up without two 
parents in the household.125 In New Orleans and elsewhere, the instability 
wrought by mass incarceration left families and communities “broken 
beyond repair.”126 
Presently, a marked philosophical shift away from costly and pun-
ishment-focused crime control has gained traction. Since the beginnings 
of the mass incarceration movement, progressive counterarguments have 
centered on the disproportionate focus and deleterious effects on low-
income urban neighborhoods.127 A growing chorus on the right has now 
                                                      
 120. Id. at 5. 
 121. Id. at 7, 15. According to the report, incarceration has been declining in effectiveness as a 
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visits). 
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Human Rights). 
 127. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS (2010). Alexander writes that crime control practices over the last 30 years creat-
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ment discrimination, housing discrimination, denial of the right to vote, denial of educational oppor-
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moved towards sensible reforms to the criminal justice system.128 The 
impetus for change varies in conservative circles with budgetary con-
cerns,129 interests in personal liberty, and the “moral and spiritual” impli-
cations of mass incarceration all cited as bases for reform.130 Regardless 
of its primary motivation, the turnabout has generated bipartisan support 
for a new approach.131 
Without question, a criminal justice system that favors alternatives 
to imprisonment holds promise.132 Meaningful sentencing reform, how-
ever, requires more than the replacement of prison terms with probation, 
fines, or other noncustodial sentences.133 While a concession to the 
inefficacy of long prison sentences, this model also represents a cost-
shifting measure from taxpayers onto the backs of the poor.134 More 
troublingly, it traps indigent criminal defendants in an endless cycle of 
courtrooms and confinement due to an inability to pay costs associated 
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never be anything.”) and the corresponding high rate of recidivism (“[W]hen prisoners were released 
the guards would say, ‘See you in a few months.’”). Id. 
 132. NICOLE D. PORTER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE STATE OF SENTENCING 2014: 
DEVELOPMENTS IN POLICY AND PRACTICE 1, 13 (2014), available at http://sentencingproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/sen_State_of_Sentencing_2014.pdf (highlighting the efficacy of expanded 
sentencing alternatives, including broadening probation and parole policies, among “legislative 
changes to improve criminal justice policy”). 
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with a conviction.135 For example, in Texas, former Governor Rick Perry 
has touted the state’s movement towards rehabilitation-focused proba-
tionary sentences for drug offenders as an alternative to incarceration.136 
Texas, however, imposes mandatory fees upon probationers to offset the 
cost of supervision—a near-insurmountable obligation for indigents.137 
Failure to pay the fees may result in the accrual of additional financial 
penalties, suspension of the probationer’s driver’s license, or jail time.138 
In a similar vein, Senator Marco Rubio celebrated Florida’s commitment 
to helping “individuals and families whose lives have been wrecked by 
drugs find a productive path forward.”139 But for defendants convicted of 
such crimes, that “path” includes mandatory recoupment fees for court-
appointed public defenders, onerous payment schedules, and obligations 
to private collection agencies that charge up to a forty percent surcharge 
on amounts collected.140 
Like Texas and Florida, Louisiana funds its criminal courts by 
leveling stiff financial obligations on indigent criminal defendants.141 
Eight in ten Louisiana criminal defendants qualify as indigent.142 After 
an ephemeral dip in 2007, the poverty rate has risen to 18% statewide 
and 27% in New Orleans.143 Still, the state’s court-imposed financial ob-
                                                      
 135. BANNON, NAGRECHA & DILLER, supra note 133, at 1; GOFFMAN, supra note 110, at 17–
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ligations rival the most oppressive fees nationwide.144 Individuals con-
victed of an offense in New Orleans are charged $100 simply to enter 
into a payment plan for court costs.145 Fines, fees, and corresponding 
payment plans are formulated without consideration about the defend-
ant’s ability to pay.146 Those who fail to render payment in full within 
sixty days accrue additional interest and late fees.147 In addition, parishes 
are authorized by state law to levy discretionary “special court costs” 
upon criminal defendants.148 Remarkably, Louisiana lacks a mechanism 
to track the total amount of court-related fees imposed on criminal de-
fendants.149 Yet the state “has dozens, if not hundreds, of assessments” 
throughout its criminal code.150 
The monies amassed through fines, penalties, and so-called user 
fees against indigent defendants fund virtually every facet of the New 
Orleans criminal justice system.151 Indeed, the dollars cover more than 
operational expenditures and extend to nonessentials such as “premium 
health care benefits” for judges.152 The benefits, which cost up to 
$15,000 per judge annually, are paid for through a “judicial expense 
fund”— a kind of “slush fund” for discretionary spending.153 To sidestep 
restrictions on state-funded health benefits, judges characterize fines and 
fees as “self-generated” and not public money.154 In effect, “judicial ex-
pense funds” encourage judges to convict criminal defendants, impose 
harsh fines, and issue arrest warrants for nonpayment.155 
Beyond monetary sanctions for failure to pay court-related costs, 
Louisiana suspends driver’s licenses for missed payments—creating a 
Hobson’s choice for individuals whose ability to earn a paycheck relies 
on driving to work.156 Moreover, courts routinely extend probation terms 
                                                      
 144. See BANNON, NAGRECHA & DILLER, supra note 133. 
 145. Id. at 6. 
 146. Id. at 1. 
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 150. Id. at 10. 
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for failure to pay a debt in full, even when the defendant has satisfied the 
other conditions of supervision.157 Of course, lengthier probation 
sentences increase the likelihood of additional violations and revocation. 
Revocation of probation may deprive otherwise-eligible individuals of 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), food stamps, earned 
income tax credits, and Supplemental Security Income (SSI).158 
Finally, arrest warrants for debt-related violations of supervision 
are routine—and generally mean jail time after bond is automatically set 
at $20,000.159 In New Orleans, a recently filed federal lawsuit documents 
that “poor people are indefinitely jailed if they fall behind on payments 
of court fines, fees and assessments.”160 The complaint describes “curso-
ry and fleeting” court hearings taking place “days or weeks” after an ar-
rest.161 The hearings often fail to identify the specific debts or fees owed, 
their amounts, or the date on which they were incurred.162 If the debtor 
cannot pay “an arbitrary amount of money,” he or she is sent back to 
jail.163 As in all other proceedings, the court makes no inquiry into the 
debtor’s ability to pay.164 
Louisiana’s ignominious incarceration rates have long been driven 
by market-based strategies that generate private sector profits and 
government savings.165 Currently, the state’s prison population is declin-
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ing and is expected to decrease by three percent by 2018.166 In place of 
long prison sentences, unpaid fines and “user fees” have created a kind 
of “poverty to jail” pipeline. Tellingly, Calvin Johnson, a former chief 
judge in Orleans Parish Criminal District Court has described the city’s 
system “crazy”: “[Paying] $23 a day to the Sheriff to house someone in 
the Jail for 30 days to collect $100.”167 Less “crazy” than calculated, the 
strategy keeps jails and court coffers full at the expense of the poor. 
III. POSSIBLE CORRECTIVE MEASURES 
In the context of post-Katrina New Orleans schools and criminal 
justice systems, there are several prescriptive remedies that warrant ex-
ploration. For students left behind the “progress” made by New Orleans 
charter school system, the solution is as simple as putting more energy 
into protecting the public system. More importantly, those schools al-
ready subject to market-based principles should be held to the same 
standards for admissions,168 access, discipline, and teacher retention as 
public schools. Adherence to government-mandated standards will pro-
mote more equitable access to education. Supervision by locally elected 
school board members—rather than a private nonprofit—will increase 
accountability. The “gains” of charter schools in standardized test scores 
are outweighed by the much more significant “costs” to community, ac-
countability and access. Furthermore, state and local officials should pur-
sue a a more equitable allocation of resources to traditional public 
schools to correct the problems that plague such schools, rather than 
force a community into an entirely different model. Finally, community-
based groups must actively participate in the creation of school policies 
that considers challenges created by poverty. This is particularly im-
portant in urban areas such as New Orleans, where thirty-nine percent of 
children live below the poverty level.169 
In the criminal justice realm, just treatment of indigent defendants 
requires broad systemic changes. First, New Orleans courts—like their 
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federal counterparts—must impose fines based on a defendant’s ability 
to pay. Under federal law, a court must consider the defendant’s “in-
come, earning capacity, and financial resources” in determining whether 
to levy a fine.170 Federal courts must also assess the burden a fine will 
place upon the defendant and any person who is financially dependent on 
the defendant.171 Due process demands that New Orleans courts conduct 
similar inquiries when a fine is initially imposed and throughout any fur-
ther proceedings. Moreover, an indigency determination at any proceed-
ing should exempt defendants from user fees or related costs. Adoption 
of standards modeled after federal law will protect the rights of indigent 
defendants and encourage New Orleans to implement a more just, equi-
table, and sustainable method of funding its court system.172 
Secondly, monies collected through the New Orleans court system 
should, at most, cover only essential operational expenses. Allocation of 
fines and fees to pay for judicial perks presents a clear conflict of interest 
and raises constitutional concerns. To this end, the “judicial expense 
fund” should be eliminated altogether.173 
Finally, justice requires that courts end the routine practice of incar-
cerating indigent defendants for failure to pay a debt.174 Those least able 
to afford onerous fines and fees must not be further exploited by jails and 
prisons to shore up profits. 
The mythology of the “free” market has been debunked as a shift 
from the fantasy of a free, fair and competitive market to one that is al-
most never competitive.175 Instead, it is consolidated power in the hands 
of an “effectively totalitarian” organization “operating along nondemo-
cratic lines.”176 This truth is manifested in the post-Katrina charter school 
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expansion by the near shut-out of community-based school advocates.177 
Local groups in New Orleans that have been denied charters by the 
Board of Elementary and Secondary Education charge that the “process 
unfairly favors national groups.”178 
But the post-Katrina charter school’s commitment to market-based 
principles of autonomy and deregulation also opens the door for neglect 
and weakens accountability. The current charter system—with more than 
44 school boards179—overwhelms parents. The deregulation leaves most 
people trying to navigate the system so confused that they do not know 
where to start.180 Governance challenges translate into less oversight,181 
and less accountability. For poor people with limited resources, the com-
bination of exclusion and confusion makes it difficult to access quality 
public education and obtain justice in the criminal courts. 
CONCLUSION 
If we have learned anything from Katrina, we have learned the spe-
cial challenges disaster response holds for poor people. While market-
based strategies have had some undeniable benefits in New Orleans, the 
blind adherence to market-based strategies is inherently problematic in 
schools and criminal courts. Over-reliance on “the bottom line”—
whether in standardized test scores or court funding—is not as important 
as protecting individual rights. 
Access to education and fair process within the criminal justice sys-
tem are especially critical markers of whether someone will be trapped in 
poverty. Government officials and lawmakers should be slow to embrace 
capitalism within the classroom or courtroom. The numerous efforts to 
guard against the erosion of civil rights are being pursued in the court-
room, but litigation challenges will likely yield spotty and inconsistent 
results. Lawmakers must therefore adhere to strong public policy that 
finds the proper balance between accountability and the protection of 
individual rights. Moreover, other cities should see New Orleans as a 
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cautionary tale of what could happen when market-based strategies cor-
rupt the classroom and the courtroom.182 Within the classrooms and 
criminal justice system, the pursuit of market-based principles should not 
trump justice. 
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